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Understanding the development of temporary agency work in Europe 
 
This article develops an explanatory framework for understanding the growth and development 
of temporary agency work (TAW) and the related industry. The analysis shows that explanations 
based on economic logic are helpful in understanding the choice of TAW in general. These 
explanations, however, fall short when trying to explain the growth of agency work over time or 
the variation in its use among European countries. To cope with these shortcomings, we extend 
our explanatory base to include a variety of sociocultural dynamics. Our analysis shows how 
deep-seated national work-related values (‘deep embeddedness’) affect the way TAW is regulated 
nationally. It also demonstrates how differences in more changeable norms, attitudes and 
practices (‘dynamic embeddedness’) affect the process of embedding agency work as a societally 
acceptable phenomenon, providing a basis for its subsequent proliferation. 
 
Key words: Human Resource Management, Transactions Cost Economics Approach, Temporary 
Agency Work 
 
Hiring temporary workers via a temporary work agency (TWA) is now common practice in all 
kinds of work organisations. Although the open-ended employment contract is still dominant, the 
role of temporary agency work (TAW) cannot be ignored. Recent academic publications 
produced by the HR/employment relations community reflect a growing interest in this emerging 
phenomenon (Barker and Christensen, 1998; Blanpain and Biagi, 1999; Felstead and Jewson, 
1999; Mangan, 2000; Carre et al., 2000; Beynon et al., 2002). Over the past decade, most 
European countries have also shown a significant growth in the use of TAW (Bergström and 
Storrie, 2003). What factors are driving this development? Economic explanations can provide 
part of the answer, but fall short when trying to explain the development of TAW over time and 
the variation in its proliferation among various European countries. We argue that, to explain the 
development of a ‘morally loaded concept’ (Nelson and Sampat, 2001: 16) such as that of TAW, 
we need a broader explanatory framework, which also appreciates a variety of sociocultural 
developments.  
In this article we develop such a framework. We extend an explanation based on economic 
logic with a sociocultural explanation, which emphasises the normative acceptance of TAW as a 
societal phenomenon reflecting the changing way in which we understand what can and cannot 
be done in ‘our’ European work organisations. We show how both theoretical perspectives are 
relevant for understanding two ‘stylised’ facts. The first is the rapid growth of agency work in the 
Netherlands over the past two decades. The second is the variation seen in the proliferation of 
agency work across European countries. In doing so, we show how an analysis based on 
transaction cost economics (TCE) can be enriched by operationalising the embeddedness level 
that is often neglected by economists, but which is deemed very important by social scientists 
(e.g. Granovetter, 1985; Oliver, 1996). We find that a sociocultural framework of analysis goes 
well with traditional TCE, and is necessary to understand fully decision-making around societally 
sensitive issues such as the use of TAW. 
 
DEFINITIONS 
This article focuses on the increasing use of agency work in national economies, and the 
concomitant growth of the TWA industry. The TAW contract is a specific variant of the 
temporary employment contract. The traditional open-ended employment contract between 
organisation and employee is one in which the duration remains undefined and will be specified 
at a later stage. The temporary employment contract (limited-duration contract) is different 
because it sets an explicit limit on its duration. An agency contract resembles a limited-duration 
contract, but in addition makes the duration of the contract contingent on the needs of the user 
organisation and the temporary employee. In essence, the agency contract resembles the 
American concept of ‘employment at will’, but also explicitly limits the mutual responsibilities of 
the contract parties in the future. This creates an emphasis on the specification of the immediate 
exchange relationship, commonly combined with a specific description of the task to be 
performed. The TAW contract is brought about via the intermediate service of a TWA. The work 
organisation has no formal employment contract with the employee; it has a contract with the 
agency, which in turn has a TAW employment contract with the employee. In this article we will 
use the notion of permanent worker to describe the employee who has an open-ended contract 
with a work organisation. We will use the term ‘agency worker’ to denote the employee who is 
hired via a TWA by a work organisation. 
For our analysis, the crucial difference between open-ended contracts and agency contracts 
lies in the costs of terminating the contract and in the quality/intention of the employment 
relationship between the employee and the organisation. 
While a work relationship between an agency worker and a user organisation can be terminated at 
any time at no cost to either party, an open-ended contract cannot be unilaterally terminated 
without costs.1 The costs of terminating an open-ended contract are threefold: the period of notice 
and the legal costs incurred by the work organisation in cases of dismissal when ‘legal dismissal 
protection’ is in force, and ‘costs’ in terms of negative reputation effects.2  
The fact that an agency contract can be terminated by the user organisation at any time, 
without cost, also drastically changes the characteristic of the employment relationship. The 
individual temporary contract describes a more transactional, task-oriented, opportunistic 
employment relationship, limiting the mutual responsibility of the contract parties (Lapido, 2000; 
McLean Parks et al., 1998; Rousseau and McLean Parks, 1993; Rousseau, 1990). On a societal 
level, the agency contract signals the acceptability of a regular re-evaluation of the existing 
deployment of labour. This (re)commodification of the employment relationship (Esping-
Andersen, 1990: 37) indicates an increasing acceptance of the rules of the market in HRM 
(Kamoche, 1994, makes a similar argument for the development of the HR function in 
organisations). The fundamental distinction that sets agency work apart from traditional 
employment is its reliance on market governance rather than on hierarchical governance over the 
employment relationship between the agency worker and the user organisation (e.g. Purcell and 
Purcell, 1998).  
 
THE TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS APPROACH  
TCE is developed to match specific transactions with specific governance structures. In the case 
of the transaction of labour, TCE explains which governance structure fits best: market contracts, 
a structured labour market with specific institutional arrangements (eg collective agreements 
                                                 
1 Nor, for the matter, can this happen with a contract of limited duration. 
2 This is because an open-ended contract implies a mutual expectation of an ongoing relationship between the 
employer and employee. It is a relational contract in which trust (Shaw, 1997; Costa, 2000; Nooteboom, 2002) is an 
essential ingredient. Cases of unjust dismissal may negatively affect the attitudes of other permanent employees 
towards the organization. However, the effects of a lost reputation do not apply only to the employer: the employee 
faces similar costs following a unilateral termination of an open-ended contract. Few employers are willing to risk 
investing in an employee whose job record suggests a disregard for the long-term commitment implied by an open-
ended contract.  
between social partners) or the internal market of the hierarchy (Williamson et al., 1975). TCE 
postulates that three factors determine the relative costs of market contracting versus hierarchical 
governance: asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty. In situations of high-asset specificity 
where job-idiosyncrasy is high, employer and employee are locked into a dependent relationship, 
where both rely on each other. To exclude opportunistic behaviour in such situations through 
market contracts invokes high transaction costs due to the complexity of the required contracts 
and the expensive monitoring of behaviour. Alternatively, a hierarchy with an internal labour 
market would economise on transaction costs, because the organisation, in contrast with the 
market, can cope more effectively with information asymmetries between employer and 
employee. It can allow for incomplete contracting because of more efficient monitoring and the 
existence of relational trust, resulting in an attitude of consummate cooperation: ‘an affirmative 
job attitude whereby gaps are filled, initiative is taken, and judgment is exercised in an 
instrumental way’ (Williamson, 1985: 262) to deal with the gaps in the employment contract. 
Also, in case of conflicts, the organisation as a ‘private court of ultimate appeal’ has more 
possibilities to explore facts than an external court in the case of conflicts regarding a market 
contract. According to TCE, the contracts between workers, TWAs and firms constitute a specific 
case of contracting through the external labour market, which coordinates transactions of labour 
efficiently in case of low-asset specificity, low uncertainty and for both recurrent and occasional 
transactions (Williamson, 1979).  
Surprisingly few studies have applied the concepts of TCE directly to the phenomenon of 
agency work. Davis-Blake and Uzzi (1993) do not refer to TCE, but assign great explanatory 
power to skill requirements, a concept that is very similar to job idiosyncrasy. In another study, 
Gannon and Nollen (1997) argue that transaction cost theory is relevant but do not back this up 
with empirical evidence. Nevertheless, ample indirect evidence can be presented that supports the 
arguments of TCE. Table 1 shows the outcome of a recent survey conducted among 500 work 
organisations in Europe in order to determine what motivates a firm to hire agency workers.  
 
TABLE 1 Reasons of European work organisations for hiring agency workers a 
Reasons for engaging agency workers   % 
Provide employees for regular jobs    15 
- to convert to permanent posts    11 
- because they are cheaper       1 
- other reasons        3 
 
Provide specialised skills       5 
 
Help absorb fluctuations     81 
- replacements      27 
- seasonal fluctuations     23 
- unexpected peaks      21 
- economic cycle      10 
 
a The question in the survey on which the table is based was: ‘Could you please indicate what 
percentage of the agency workers you contracted for what reason?’ Multiple reasons could be 
given, so the total is greater than 100.  
Source: CIETT, 2000 
 
It appears that the major drive is summed up by the term ‘variable frequency’. Agency 
labour is appropriate for jobs that cannot be guaranteed for long periods (ie temporary jobs that 
are not enduring) because of seasonal fluctuations, unexpected peaks, economic cycles or 
reintegrating permanent employees (81 per cent). Similar results were found in other comparable 
surveys (Van der Heijden, 1995; Timmerhuis and De Lange, 1998). TCE would argue that a firm 
can hire temporary workers with short-term contracts itself without the intermediation of a TWA, 
but the costs of searching, negotiating, drafting the contract and monitoring would be higher for 
individual firms than for a TWA. A TWA can create a pool of temporary workers and a pool of 
firms, which enables them to transform the irregularity at individual level into a permanent 
demand and supply at aggregate level (the argument is similar to the emergence of so-called 
trilateral governance structures in Williamson, 1979).  
However, hiring agency workers is not the only way to solve the problem of temporary 
work. Other solutions include overtime by permanent employees, slack in the number of 
permanent staff and outsourcing. Transaction cost theory predicts that agency workers will 
primarily be employed in jobs with low levels of job-idiosyncrasy (i.e. asset specificity in the 
employment relationship). Data concerning the nature of agency jobs confirms this expectation. 
Table 2 shows the kind of agency jobs mediated in 1999 by the nine largest TWAs in the 
Netherlands.  
 
TABLE 2 Characteristics of agency jobs, 1999 
Jobs    Total agency jobs a  Total agency hours b 
     %    % 
Administrative   25    33.5 
Medical    13      3.4 
Skilled manual labour     3      9.9 
Unskilled manual labour  59    49.0 
Unknown      -      4.2 
 
Source: a NEI/ABU, 2000; b Labour Force survey, CBS, 2002 
 
Most of the manual jobs were classified as unskilled. Also, the administrative and medical 
agency jobs are either relatively unskilled or feature the type of work that can draw on codified, 
non-idiosyncratic skills (nursing, secretarial work and accounting skills), facilitating the transfer 
through the labour market.3 OECD analyses on 28 countries confirm that temporary work is most 
prevalent in either unskilled or administrative and customer-related occupations (OECD, 2002: 
138).  
 
Proposition 1 TAW is chosen for labour transactions with relatively high contracting costs (i.e. 
relatively low frequency) combined with low asset specificity (low skill requirements and codified 
skills). 
                                                 
3 When uncertainty is high, the same argument holds as in the case of high-asset specificity: due to the possibility of 
opportunism, contracting costs will increase and a specific intermediate TWA will be able to coordinate more 
efficiently.  
 SHORTCOMINGS OF THE TCE MODEL 
The evidence presented in the previous section supports the assertion that TCE addresses some of 
the mechanisms underlying the choice for TAW. However, in our study of the TWA industry we 
came across at least two situations where TCE failed to help us understand the incidence of 
TAW. First, in mapping the development of TAW and the growth of the TWA industry in the 
Netherlands, the rapid growth during the 1980s did not coincide with significant changes in the 
factors that TCE suggests would affect the choice for TAW. And, secondly, when evaluating 
differences in proliferation of agency work in various European countries, they did not seem to 
coincide with the relevant national characteristics from a TCE perspective. 
 
TAW growth in the Netherlands 
The growth of TAW over the past two decades in the Netherlands has been remarkable. Figure 1 
shows the development of agency work and the use of limited-duration contracts. The Dutch use 
of TAW more than doubled from the early 1980s into the mid- and late 1990s (Koene et al., 
2003). Even now, after the worldwide slump in the agency sector, the Dutch volume of TAW, 
with an average number of 169,000 jobs in 2002, is still twice as high as in the early 1980s. 
As the total number of contingent jobs in the Dutch labour market grew, the share of TAW 
in this category of contingent work increased from 22 to 24 per cent between 1970 and 1980, 
climbed to 28 per cent in 1990 and rose further to 38 per cent in 1999. To explain these 
developments, TCE would look for changes in the conditions governing the contracting of 
temporary agency workers or permanent employees. From that perspective, a growth of 
temporary work, as occurred in the Netherlands, should be the result of changes in the nature of 
the transaction (less frequency, less uncertainty, less asset specificity), or changes in the ‘rules of 
the game’, which would make temporary work less costly than the other options. Although 
accurate data on these issues is hard to get, indirect data does not point to such developments. 
Studying the relationship between technological innovation (as an indirect indicator of asset 
specificity) and the use of agency workers in the Netherlands, Kleinknecht (1997) did not find 
any correlation between various measures of process innovation and the demand for agency 
workers or other temporary employees. Also, for the other dimensions of the labour transaction, 
uncertainty and frequency, no direct or indirect evidence can be found that would point in the 
direction of structural changes in the labour market.4 During the 1990s, the share of the different 
occupations in the volume of agency work has remained relatively stable, with low-skilled 
technical jobs accounting for almost half the temporary work hours in the Netherlands (CBS, 
2000). Also, the other explanation of a change in the rules of the game is not confirmed in the 
Dutch case. Even when we broaden our understanding of TCE, not just focusing on changes in 
the attributes of the transaction but also considering changes in the underlying formal rules of the 
game (eg Williamson, 1998, 2000), TCE does not seem to be coming up with any clear answers 
for the the Netherlands’ steep growth. 
 
FIGURE 1 Development of the number of agency jobs (thousands), 1970-2000 
 
Source: National Labour Statistics Netherlands, CBS, 2001a 
a The discontinuity in the year 1995 is caused by recalculations of the national statistics 
  
Changes in the legal framework might have reduced the costs of using agency work, 
increased the costs of using open-ended contracts or pushed work organisations to act more in 
line with the expectations of transaction cost theory. However, since the adoption of the 
Temporary Work Act in 1965, no significant changes in the legislation of agency work occurred 
                                                 
4 Several recent studies did point out the relevance of frequency and uncertainty arguments for the pro-cyclical 
change of the use of TAW (eg Zijl et al., 2003) and the role of agencies in tight labour markets (Houseman et al., 
2003). These studies, however, do not address structural changes that lead to long-term growth of the TWA industry 
and the use of TAW.  
until 1998. Dismissal protection has been relaxed rather than strengthened (Van der Heijden, 
1995), reducing the cost of open-ended contracts.5 
The pursuit of flexibility in the workforce might also be regarded as a response to the 
increased competitive demands caused by the process of economic globalisation (eg CBS, 1996). 
According to Williamson (1994), competition pushes organisations to act more in line with 
transaction cost requirements. Examining this last relationship for the Netherlands, however, 
Vosse (1999) argues against it, finding no significant relation between the degree of 
internationalisation of organisations and their use of contingent employees. 
In 1998 the Dutch government did adopt the Flexibility and Security Act (which came into 
force in 1999): this radically changed the legal position of TAW. Its implementation, however, 
should be seen more as the government’s response to the increase in agency work than as a 
driving force behind its growth. The act did affect the relative costs of both agency work and 
limited-duration contracts, but in the opposite direction: over the past few years, the TWA 
industry in particular has stated time and again that the new regulation changed the ‘rules of the 
game’ to the disadvantage of TAW as it increased the relative costs of this form of employment. 
 
Differences across Europe 
We encounter similar problems using TCE to explain the variation in the use of TAW in various 
European countries. Again, the conditioning factors highlighted from a TCE perspective are not 
instrumental in understanding the differences in proliferation of TAW among European 
countries. Table 3 shows the differences in relative use of agency work in eight European 
countries, and relates them to employer-sponsored, employer-specific vocational training as an 
indicator of job idiosyncrasy, and to type of regulation as a reflection of the ‘formal rules of the 
game’. 
Table 3 shows that in 1999 the market penetration rate of TAW appears to vary between a 
minimum of 0.16 per cent of the total number of jobs in Italy and a maximum of 4.5 per cent of 
the total number of jobs in the Netherlands. It appears that the penetration rate is substantial in 
three countries: the Netherlands, the UK and France. In the other countries, the penetration rate is 
still very low. 
                                                 
5 During the 1980s and the 1990s, the ‘quick and dirty’ dismissal procedures via the district court became common 
practice. Nowadays, more than a third of dismissal procedures pass via the courts instead of the lengthy bureaucratic 
procedure via the regional employment office. In the 1970s, dismissal cases at the courts were exceptional.  
Employer-sponsored vocational training –focusing on employer-initiated ‘internal and 
external courses and structured on-the-job training, but excluding initial vocational training’ 
(OECD, 1999: 140, 142)– reflects the need for additional job-specific training of employees. 
Taking it as a measure of job idiosyncrasy, TCE would lead us to expectations very much at odds 
with the data presented in Table 3. High levels of employer-sponsored vocational training, such 
as found in the UK, the Netherlands and France, would predict low use of TAW. The lower 
levels of specific employer-sponsored training would lead us to expect less job idiosyncrasy in 
Italy and Spain, leading to a broader use of TAW.  
 
TABLE 3 Factors theoretically associated with differences in use of agency work in Europe 
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Market penetration rate 
1999 
        
Temporary agency jobs a 4.5 4.0 2.7 0.7 0.8 0.16 0.8 0.19 
         
Attributes of the 
transaction: 
        
Employer-sponsored 
vocational training for total 
workforce b 
17.2 15.8 20.1 8.2 10.0 6.1 - 12.9 
Average hours of training c 1.5- 2.5- 1.5- 1.0- 0.5- 0.5- - 1.0- 
(maximum %) d 2.0 3.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.0  1.5 
         
Formal rules of the game         
Regulation (since) e L L M R R M L M 
 (1998)    (1994) (1997) (1993) (1990) 
a as % of total number of jobs 
b Data from EUROSTAT, CVTS, 1994 
c average hours of training per employee 
d Employer training costs as share of total labour costs 
e Restrictiveness of national legislation: L = liberal, M = moderate, R = restrictive 
Source: CIETT (2000), OECD (2000) and OECD (1999) 
 
To assess the relationship between the penetration rate of agency work and the formal 
rules of the game, we use a composite measure to indicate the relative restrictiveness of the 
regulation of agency work. It is taken from the CIETT report on the TWA industry presented in 
December 2000 (CIETT, 2000: 39), drawing heavily on Clauwaert (2000), who describes the 
legal context for agency work in the countries of the European Union. We relate the penetration 
rate of agency work to the national legal context, scoring the legal framework on the basis of a 
three-point scale: liberal (L), moderate (M) and restrictive (R). In a liberal national legal context, 
there are few restrictions on agency work; its use and development is left to the market. 
Restrictiveness has to do with the conditions under which agency work is allowed, ranging from 
outright prohibition to restrictions on sectors in which it is permitted; limitation of reasons for 
which agency work is allowed (eg unusual work, bridging recruitments, replacing absent workers 
and temporary increase in workload); or time constraints (eg maximum period of assignments or 
synchronisation ban and prohibiting the end of a contract between a TWA and agency employee 
corresponding to the end of the assignment with the user company). If legal recognition of the 
industry is recent (as in Spain, Italy and Sweden), the year of legalisation is stated in the table. If 
major changes in the legislative context altered the level of restrictiveness, the date is mentioned 
in the table (Denmark and the Netherlands relaxed their legal constraints on TWAs in 1990 and 
1998 respectively).  
It appears from the table that no correlation can be observed between the relative 
restrictiveness of the legal framework governing agency work and penetration rate. The 
penetration rate in Sweden, which has had a liberal regulatory framework since 1993, is still 
relatively low. Countries with moderate regulation of agency work vary greatly in terms of 
penetration rates. While the Netherlands (the move from moderate to liberal was made only 
recently) and France have high levels of penetration, the levels of penetration in Italy and 
Denmark are very low. The countries with a relatively long history of legal recognition of the 
industry (Netherlands, UK and France) show the highest penetration rates. This may, however, be 
taken as an indication that the use of agency work in a specific country is not affected by changes 
of a legal nature as such, but more by subtle societal changes that occur in the general attitudes 
towards agency work over time. Legal changes can then play a role, either initiating such 
developments, or lagging behind and following broader societal developments as in the example 
of the recent changes in regulation in the UK and the Netherlands. 
 EXTENDING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Consequently, although on the one hand the choice for TAW seems a typical ‘make or buy’ 
decision, ready to be handled and analysed through TCE logic, TCE logic falls short in 
explaining the longitudinal growth of the use of agency work and the international differences in 
its proliferation. Over a number of years, economic sociologists have addressed the question of 
how to consider the wider context influencing human behaviour in economic analysis. In their 
theorising, the ‘embeddedness’ of economic action in structures of social relations is a central 
issue (Granovetter, 1985). The embeddedness perspective looks on markets as both institutional 
enactments (eg Beckert, 2003) and normative and social arenas where ‘all economic exchange is 
a product of human activity and interpretation’ and, thus, ‘all exchanges are nested in opinions 
and judgments that frame the very nature of the economic transaction’ (Oliver, 1996: 170-171). 
Although TCE theorists mostly assume away variation in this broader sociocultural context over 
the short term, in ‘morally loaded’ choice situations, such as the choice to use or not to use TAW, 
our analysis might benefit from an understanding of variations in the sociocultural context over 
time and among countries.  
In a review of the developments in TCE and in the adjacent fields of social analysis, 
Williamson (1998, 2000) provides us with an insight into the economist’s perspective on the 
issue of embeddedness, distinguishing four distinct, but interrelated, levels of social analysis. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the different levels and the issues relevant to the 
dynamic at each of them. Level 1 refers to the informal institutional environment of values, 
norms, customs and traditions. The relevant approach to understand this level is ‘social theory’, 
which can be understood as history, sociology and anthropology. Level 2 refers to the formal 
institutional environment, which includes the laws exerted by the polity, judiciary and 
bureaucracy of government grounded in the theory of property rights. Level 3 refers to the 
‘institutional arrangements’ (North, 1990), or ‘governance structures’ in Williamson’s 
terminology, addressed by TCE. Level 4 describes the continuous micro processes of allocation 
in markets studied in neoclassical economic theory. 
 
FIGURE 2 Four levels of social analysis 
 
Source: Williamson, 1998, 2000 
 
Williamson’s four-level framework does offer the possibility of taking into account the 
influence of different institutional environments. Moreover, it offers the possibility of a dynamic 
analysis in which interaction between the layers shows how, over time, specific elements of the 
informal and formal institutional environment gave birth to specific institutional arrangements 
and how the emergence and development of these arrangements influence the elements of the 
environment. However, when doing this, the framework is used in a totally different 
methodological setting than that of methodological individualism of TCE (Groenewegen and 
Vromen, 1996). The explicit introduction of interaction between the layers implies an approach 
of methodological interactionism, in which the definition of the choice situation (which is taken 
as a given in TCE) becomes part of the choice process influencing the eventual outcomes (see 
also  Denzau and North, 1994; Beckert, 2003). The problems for TCE in making this shift in 
thinking are reflected in Williamson’s description of the model where he recognises the 
interrelationships between the various levels of analysis, but at the same time assumes away the 
relevance of the embeddedness level by arguing that it is not relevant for the analysis of ‘make’ 
or ‘buy’ decisions in the short term. In his discussion of the four levels of analysis, Williamson 
argues that levels 2 and 3 are especially relevant to understand decision-making within 
organisations from a transaction cost perspective: level 2 is where the rules of the game are set 
and level 3 covers how the game is played. Level 1, the social embeddedness level, ‘is taken as a 
given by most economists’ because it changes only very slowly – ‘in the order of centuries or 
millennia’ (Williamson, 2000: 596). This seems at odds with our understanding of its relevance 
for explaining the growth of agency work, which has taken place over a period of two to five 
decades at the most.  
Although Williamson points out the relevance of level 1 explanations, his description of the 
embeddedness level remains rather superficial. He and others (Williamson, 2000: 610; Smelser 
and Swedberg, 1994: 18) argue for a further theoretical specification of the concept of 
embeddedness to be of practical use. For our purposes, we propose two changes in the definition 
of embeddedness.  
First, we make a distinction between deep-seated basic values (deep embeddedness – ie 
deep level 1) and more superficial norms, attitudes and practices (dynamic embeddedness – ie 
dynamic level 1). This type of definition is congruent with developments in research on national 
and organisational cultures that distinguish deep-seated ‘implicit values and basic assumptions’, 
more consciously lived ‘norms’ and relatively superficial ‘attitudes and practices’ (eg Hofstede, 
1980, 1991; Schein, 1992). Deep embeddedness changes very slowly and fits the original 
timeframe used by Williamson (for the Dutch: a caring society, striving for consensus, 
egalitarianism etc). Norms, attitudes and practices, however, can change relatively quickly, 
constituting ‘dynamic embeddedness’. Aspects of organisational culture, perspectives on work 
and attitudes to work relationships are more dynamic and fluid, and develop more rapidly. They 
are influenced by changes in technology and the nature of work (such as the industrialisation of 
the late 18th century, the service and information age etc), and general societal trends such as 
individualisation and the recent widespread acceptance of the free market model.  
A second, related, adaptation to Williamson’s framework is our definition of ‘defining 
moments’, and has once more to do with changing the time horizon. Williamson gives as 
examples of defining moments: civil war, revolution and breakdown of economic systems such 
as those in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Such defining moments produce a sharp 
break from established procedures. Windows of opportunity to effect broad reform are thereby 
opened, according to Williamson (2000: 598). We believe that the occurrence of defining 
moments, which can result in major changes in the institutional environment, may be more 
frequent than Williamson proposed. ‘Defining moments’ can be extended to include a wider 
range of events, such as key agreements between social partners – eg the Dutch Wassenaar 
agreement in 1982. This is generally considered to mark the revitalisation of the Dutch polder 
model of industrial relations that has come into full effect in less than 15 years. Another such 
event is the victory of Margaret Thatcher in the UK in 1979. This resulted in 11 years of 
‘Thatcherism’, an era that had a profound impact on both the formal and informal rules of the 
game, as many a trade union leader discovered.  
In the following sections, we will take this multifaceted approach to sociocultural 
embeddedness and use it to examine the development of TAW in the Netherlands over the past 
two decades and subsequently the variation in proliferation of TAW among European countries. 
Building on this examination, we add propositions about the sociocultural explanations for the 
issues at hand.  
 
DYNAMIC EMBEDDEDNESS AND TAW GROWTH IN THE NETHERLANDS 
From an embeddedness perspective, the growth of agency work in the Netherlands can be 
explained by a growing societal acceptance in the country of this form of employment. In other 
words, agency work can flourish because of an increasing degree of societal legitimacy. As the 
developments we want to look at in the Netherlands span only three decades, it is not useful to 
focus on deep embeddedness for our analysis. We therefore focus on aspects of dynamic 
embeddedness. 
We discern two clear trends in the development of the societal norms, attitudes and 
practices towards agency work that evolve from the 1980s onward. The first concerns the general 
attitude of the unions towards TAW, reflected in the public debate concerning its regulation. The 
second involves the attitude of government towards private TWAs, as reflected in the discussion 
surrounding the role of the Public Employment Services (PES) in the Dutch labour market. Table 
4 demarcates the defining moments in the public debate about both the regulation of temporary 
work and the role of TWAs that preceded the growth of agency work in the Netherlands.  
 
TABLE 4 Defining moments in the development of societal attitudes towards agency work in the 
Netherlands 
Discussion of social partners on temporary agency work 
1982 ‘Wassenaar agreement’ 
1993 Report on the renewal of collective bargaining in the Netherlands, which explicitly notes 
the need for more flexibility in work patterns, both from the perspective of employees and 
employers (StAr report, ‘Flexibility and Security’, 1996). 
1999 Flexibility and Security Act 
 
Changing position of TWA industry and Public Employment Services (PES) 
1975 Increasing unemployment drives the PES to experiment with the agency formula to 
facilitate entry into the labour market for the unemployed. 
1978 The founding of ‘Start’, a temporary work agency established under the banner of the 
PES. 
1993 Dutch Court of Audit presents a report showing the ineffectiveness of the PES.  
1994 Discussions about the privatisation of the activities of the PES in the Social Economic 
Council (SER, 1994). 
1995 Extremely critical evaluation of the functioning of the PES. 
1998 Allocation of Workers via Intermediaries Act (WAADI) 
2002 Implementation Structure for Work and Income Act (SUWI) 
 
The first trend, the changing attitude of the Dutch social partners towards agency work, has been 
documented in the reports of the Dutch Labour Foundation (‘Stichting van de Arbeid, StAr’, 
1993, 1996). The Labour Foundation embodies a bipartite dialogue between employers and 
unions in the Netherlands. Until the 1980s, unions were suspicious of agency work, which was 
associated with bad employment conditions and illegal black market labour exchanges. It was 
considered undesirable, and was perceived to take advantage of people with a relatively weak 
labour market position. However, the Dutch employment crisis at the end of the 1970s and early 
1980s created a ‘sense of urgency’ and worked as a ‘triggering device’ for national-level changes 
in industrial relations, social security and ensuing labour market policy. Unions and employers’ 
associations reached what Visser and Hemerijck (1997: 60) labelled ‘a shift in the hierarchy of 
goals’, emphasising the ‘recovery of profits as a condition for investment and jobs’. The new 
intentions of the social partners were laid down in the StAr agreement of 1982, known as the 
Wassenaar agreement, which was the start of a period of wage moderation, welfare reform and 
labour market activation (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997: 16). 
The Wassenaar agreement signalled the start of a general shift in the attitude towards TAW, as it 
included a basic understanding that more flexibility in the employment relationship was 
acceptable if it was combined with increased protection for employees in flexible jobs. From 
1982 onwards, the social partners engaged in a constructive dialogue, building on the employers’ 
wish for increasing labour flexibility and the unions’ position that legitimate agency work needs 
to be supported by a social security system that takes into account the interests of agency 
workers. Three milestones that identify this dialogue are presented in Table 4. The final 
consensus on the need for ‘flexibility and security’ led to what Visser and Hemerijck label ‘the 
first proper collective agreements for temporary workers’ in 1995, introducing a right of 
continued employment and pension insurance after 24 months of service (Visser and Hemerijck, 
1997: 44). The 1999 Flexibility and Security Act anchored these changed norms and attitudes 
towards agency work within a legal framework. 
This analysis shows that, although the underlying national values did not change, the 
reconsideration of attitudes and the resulting changes in practices (dialogue and collective 
agreements), embodied in the three StAr agreements and in the 1995 collective agreement, 
clearly seem to precede the growing use of TAW in the 1980s and 1990s and the surge in its use 
after 1995. 
The second trend involves the changing attitude towards the role of TWAs in the labour 
market, and the discussion about the effectiveness of the Dutch PES. Until 1975, there was a 
clear separation between the activities of the PES and TWAs. The former focused on permanent 
jobs; the latter on temporary jobs. The distinction was based on the idea that commercial agencies 
could not be entrusted with the care of disadvantaged groups in the labour market. At that time, 
commercial temporary placement of personnel was associated with exploitation. However, 
increasing unemployment drove the PES to experiment with the agency formula to facilitate entry 
into the labour market for the unemployed. The founding of ‘Start’ in 1978, a TWA established 
under the banner of the PES, was the result. From the mid-1980s, the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the PES was increasingly questioned. At the same time, the TWA industry had organised itself 
and gained legitimacy as a result of its standard-setting industry association which, through its 10 
largest members, covered more than 80 per cent of the TAW market. As a result of these 
developments, the Dutch government has over time minimised the role of the PES and stimulated 
the activities of the private TWA industry in the labour market. The 1998 Allocation of Workers 
via Intermediaries Act (WAADI) liberalised the TWA industry by lifting the licensing obligation 
for TWAs. Furthermore, seven years of preparation led to the final restructuring of the PES in 
2002 (SUWI Act), creating public ‘centres for work and income’ and privatising activities related 
to reintegration of disadvantaged employees into the labour market (Struyven and Steurs, 2003). 
This second trend again shows a change in the attitudes and practices regarding the execution of 
labour market policy, rather than a significant change in Dutch national values regarding work or 
the relevance of labour market polices as such. The performance problems with the PES, and a 
general suspicion of public activities, combined with the increasing legitimacy of the TWA 
industry, have been major driving forces for the growth of agency work during the past decades.  
 
Proposition 2 Regulation of TAW and open discussion about its possibilities and shortcomings 
stimulates the societal acceptance of the TAW alternative. 
 
Proposition 3 Acceptance of more risk in individual employment relationships  
(free market concept) supports acceptability and subsequent proliferation  
of TAW.  
 
DEEP EMBEDDEDNESS AND THE PROLIFERATION OF TAW 
Using the embeddedness argument to explain the variation in penetration rate of TAW across 
countries focuses on differences that may have a long history and thus may reflect differences in 
deep embeddedness – ie differences in basic national work-related values (eg Hofstede, 1991, 
2001). However, as the formal acceptance of TAW is a relatively recent development in most 
countries (over the past 50 years), an explanation of country differences might also be found in 
the more superficial level of dynamic embeddedness – i.e. differences in norms, attitudes and 
practices.  
Differences in deep embeddedness are reflected in national variations in work-related values and, 
as Visser (1996) argues, differences in national industrial relations models (eg Crouch, 1993):  
 
Once established, such models of state-society relations and labour-capital bargaining change only slowly 
and have a nation-wide applicability, since they are embedded in, and support, historically evolved patterns 
of state formation, class relations and organisational behaviour which are intimately connected to national 
educational systems and cultural values.  
Visser, 1996: 28-29 
 
National differences in industrial relations systems are presented in the first section of Table 5. 
Visser (2001) distinguishes four models of industrial relations that describe the relationship 
between unions and employers, and the role of the state in Western Europe. In our comparison, 
the Netherlands and Germany represent the ‘central social partnership’ style. This combines 
disciplined attention to the interests of the social partners in a balanced, employer-led 
relationship. Sweden and Denmark represent the ‘Northern corporatist’ style, where the 
relationship between unions and employers is disciplined and balanced, but labour-led; social 
partners lead the way while government plays a facilitating role. Visser positions France, Italy 
and Spain in a cluster, with Portugal and Greece representing his ‘Latin confrontational’ model of 
industrial relations. In the Latin confrontational style, the relationship between unions and 
employers is volatile and characterised by rivalry and the relationship between the social partners 
is weak, resulting in a large intervening and regulatory role for the state; the notion of the welfare 
state is rudimentary, although the rights to work and welfare are stated publicly. Finally, the UK 
is representative of ‘Anglo-Saxon pluralism’, characterised by a volatile and unstable bargaining 
relationship between unions and employers, both operating from adversarial value systems: the 
state is relatively uninvolved; development of temporary work is ‘left to the market’. 
The indicators of deep embeddedness in Table 5 show no apparent relationship with the 
proliferation of agency work. A certain type of industrial relations system does not seem to 
favour or hamper the development of TAW as such. This leads us to conclude that although the 
emergence of TAW reflects a change in the governance structures concerning the employment 
relationship, TAW itself is not related to specific values (ie preferred states to be). Deep 
embeddedness, however, does affect the way in which TAW is regulated: carefully in the 
Netherlands, only reluctantly in the UK, paternalistically in Spain, and strictly through collective 
agreements in Sweden.  
 
TABLE 5 Penetration rate and indicators of societal legitimacy of agency work in Europe 
 
 
Adapted from: 
a CIETT (2000) 
b Visser (2001) 
c ILO (1997) 
 
Proposition 4 National culture does not affect the choice for TAW per se. It does, however, affect 
the typical institutionalisation of TAW (ie the way in which acceptable TAW is regulated in a 
specific national context). 
 
The second half of Table 5 compares the countries in our analysis on variables reflecting 
differences in dynamic embeddedness. The variables resemble the norms, attitudes and practices 
that we used in the analysis of the Dutch case: a broad evaluation of the general attitude in a 
society towards TAW reflected in the unions' position towards this type of work (acceptance, 
caution, distrust), the strength of collective labour in the public debate (reflected in union density 
and change in union density from 1985-1995), and the relative strength of the PES in comparison 
with the role of TWAs in the labour market (strong or weak). The country scores are based on an 
evaluation of industrial relations regimes presented by Visser (2001) and ILO data for 
unionisation (ILO, 1997). 
Although similar to industrial relations models, the IR climates of the Netherlands and Germany 
differ significantly. In the Netherlands, indigenous multinational enterprises have a relatively 
large impact whereas the ethic of craftsmanship in Germany has created strongly voiced labour 
participation, sceptical of innovations in the employment relationship affecting employee 
security. The different attitudes towards agency work seen in the Netherlands (ie acceptance) and 
Germany (ie distrust) may well result from this relative lack of power of the unions in the 
Netherlands, which leads to an accommodating position trying to regulate, rather than ban, TAW.  
In Sweden and Denmark, the ‘Northern corporatist’ style takes a comprehensive approach to 
welfare (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1997) with a traditionally large role for the PES in securing the 
‘right to work’. The attitude towards contingent employment is cautious: accepting, but very 
strictly regulated. Temporary work is seen as a solution to a specific set of problems in the labour 
market.  
In the ‘Latin confrontational’ model of industrial relations (France, Italy and Spain), the attitude 
towards agency work is distrustful, especially because of its possible effects on employment 
security and working conditions. Significant mutual distrust between social partners and 
problems in upholding rules and regulations in the area make legislators reluctant and very strict 
in regulating the sector. In all three countries, the PES fulfils an important role in the labour 
market as unemployment is relatively high and politics proclaims the need for protection of 
employees against opportunistic employment practices. In comparison with Italy and Spain, 
union strength in France is relatively weak, which is reflected in the low degree of unionisation 
and a sharp decrease from 1985-1995.  
In the UK’s market-based model of ‘Anglo-Saxon pluralism’, the role of the PES is weak. Union 
attitudes towards temporary work have until recently been negative (Heery, forthcoming), but 
their impact on the public debate is small. Traditionally, unionisation in the UK was high, but 
since the early 1980s the country’s embrace of the free market doctrine has resulted in a notable 
decrease in union density from 1985-1995.  
The summary of this analysis is presented in the second part of Table 5. The table shows that the 
penetration rate of agency work correlates well with norms, attitudes and practices that support 
national experimentation with, and dialogue about, the legitimacy of TAW in each country. For 
example, countries such Germany and Sweden are critical of agency work, and labour 
representatives only accept it while watching its development closely. Furthermore, in Sweden 
the PES holds a strong position. In both countries, the attitude towards the use of agency work is 
less favourable. In contrast, countries such as the Netherlands, the UK and France demonstrate 
either a more accepting attitude towards agency work or a weaker position of unions (there is a 
lower degree of unionisation in France) or the PES (its operation is much criticised in the 
Netherlands). 
Although relatively superficial (and thus easier to change), these indicators of dynamic 
embeddedness signal crossnational differences that create different starting positions for the 
development of TAW and the TWA industry in each country. Looking at these differences, we 
conclude that the degree of perceived legitimacy of a national discussion about the possibilities of 
TAW might be pivotal in understanding its penetration rate. These findings confirm our 
conclusions from the Dutch case. Again, the proliferation of TAW does not depend on value 
congruence between this form of employment and the national cultural value system. It does, 
however, seem to depend on the norms, attitudes and practices that affect the national discourse 
on TAW, confirming its legitimacy and facilitating its use in the labour market. 
 
CONCLUSION: COMPARING EXPLANATIONS FOR GROWTH 
In this article we have analysed the development and growing use of agency work over the past 
decades. We developed a framework extending an analysis based on economic logic with a 
sociocultural explanation. TCE did help to understand the choice for temporary agency workers 
in general. However, the economic analysis could not explain the strong growth of agency work 
over time in the Netherlands, or the variation in proliferation of agency work among different 
European countries.  
The analysis of these phenomena benefited from a careful evaluation of the sociocultural context 
in which TAW and the related TWA industry developed. The interest in the social embeddedness 
of economic action is not new. Social theorists have argued for its relevance for decades (e.g. 
Granovetter, 1985; Oliver, 1996; Beckert, 2003). Furthermore, economists also recognise the 
importance of societal norms and values, especially when performing inter-temporal, 
international or cross-cultural comparisons. Nevertheless, the informal institutions in which work 
transactions are embedded are often given too little attention. Summarising the leading approach 
in transaction cost economics, Williamson argues that, considering the timeframe of the 
dynamics, TCE should leave the analysis of sociocultural embeddedness to economic historians 
and social scientists as these kinds of developments occur over ‘centuries or millennia’ 
(Williamson, 2000: 596). Our analysis shows that attempts to understand the development of 
agency work over time and across nations are hampered by such disciplinary boundaries.  
By extending Williamson’s description of embeddedness to include changes in societal attitudes 
that happen over a relatively short period, it becomes possible to incorporate valuable 
sociocultural explanations into our analyses. The changes in societal attitudes towards TAW over 
the past two decades in the Netherlands, and the relevance of sociocultural differences for 
understanding the European variation in national proliferation of agency work, illustrate this 
point. These examples clearly show the consistent interrelatedness between economic factors and 
the sociocultural variables defining the very nature of economic transactions (e.g. Oliver, 1996). 
Therefore, when building models that relate ‘different levels of social analysis’ (Williamson, 
2000), the greater challenge is to integrate them sensibly, rather than to uncouple and separate 
them. These kinds of integrated frameworks can help to analyse the processes by which industries 
establish legitimacy and create societal acceptance of their products, which seem crucial for 
understanding industry growth. 
Analyses combining these perspectives present us with a rich area for further exploration of the 
possibilities for cross-fertilisation between TCE and institutional theory. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
The preceding sections have outlined the rise and acceptance of TAW, and the associated TWA 
industry, as a legitimate part of the labour market in the Netherlands. They have also shown the 
importance of societal acceptance of TAW for its proliferation in various European countries. 
Our analyses indicate that the growing use of agency work over the past two decades is not just 
an economic and numerical fact, but also reflects a normative change in the societal attitude 
towards temporary work. These findings have implications for our understanding of the 
sociocultural embeddedness of HR choices, and for our understanding of factors contributing to 
the development of the TWA industry in Europe.  
What are the implications at an organisational level and for HRM? The increasing emphasis on 
flexibility seen in firms over the past two decades has produced an increased blurring of 
organisational boundaries. These have become permeable not only in firms involved in joint 
ventures or networks, but also in individual companies. The questions of whether to ‘make’ or 
‘buy’, and how to choose the right partner, are continual concerns, not only with respect to the 
production of goods or services but also in relation to functional areas such as marketing, 
purchasing, accounting and HRM.  
The field of HRM is confronted with an increasing differentiation of the workforce, creating new 
opportunities for labour sourcing. At every hierarchical level of the organisation we encounter 
employees with open-ended contracts, but also agency workers, freelancers, consultants etc. 
Strategic HRM emphasises the organisational impetus for these changes, explaining the growing 
need for different kinds of employment relations depending on, for example, strategic value and 
uniqueness of an employee’s contribution to the organisation (e.g. Lepak and Snell, 1999).  
However, HR experts, especially when operating in an international context, need to realise that 
the acceptance of temporary work as ‘normal work’ next to, for example, open-ended contracts 
and project work, is not self-evident everywhere. In countries in which the use of agency work 
has grown, this is not a pure consequence of economic necessity, but also a matter of societal 
acceptance of a specific employment relationship with its own merits and effects. Our findings 
show that sociocultural processes, enhancing the societal embeddedness of temporary work and 
the role of the TWA industry, provide an explanation for the proliferation of agency work over 
time and across European countries. The present EU-level interest in TAW (EU directive 
proposal, 2002), although proceeding only slowly at the European level, may speed up national 
dialogues on characteristics, consequences and possibilities of TAW. In the process, it may also 
lead to a further local embedding of agency work and support its proliferation in European 
countries in which the social partners (mainly trade unions) have until now demonstrated a 
hesitant (eg Germany, Italy, Spain) attitude towards TAW or have almost ignored it completely 
(eg Greece). A critical factor for success, however, seems to be a positive attitude towards the 
definition of a societally acceptable form of TAW and the role that the TWA industry can fulfil in 
the national  and international labour markets. 
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